What's the difference between indirect and direct federation?Some on this forum have mentioned Delta, which uses email for an account. Email uses indirect federation, when direct federation would be better to reduce spoofing.
Skype was peer-to-peer, and Microsoft still found a way.Signal and Telegram had centralized servers, so this made it easier for the companies to change their model.
Which also makes the protocol more resilient and harder to block.Indirect federation has plenty of connection routes to multiple servers between email ends. There's a lot of potential for spoofing and unsecure entrances between these points.
I'm not sure I agree with your direct-indirect federation taxonomy, and you really shouldn't accept mail from a domain that doesn't use an SPF record anyway. The ability to have multiple intermediate hops as needed adds resiliency and scalability to the protocol.Alternate routing availability through indirect federation? It's still less secure, unless all of the points are determined and known to be secured from the start. Signal and Telegram were blocked in some countries, which was mentioned in the article about Delta, though these are centralized rather than any kind of Federated network.
Well, the Gnupg web of trust didn't work out so well. The CA situation has improved dramatically with the rise of Let's Encrypt. Maybe just a better curated and smaller set of roots will do. In any case, I think the Openssl monoculture is a far bigger problem.On another note, instead of certificate authority (CA) for security handshakes, XMPP needs an opensource standard for secure server negotiations, perhaps on the same machines or location that hosts an XMPP server that replaces the CA for that purpose. Perhaps an XMPP extention thats purpose is to replace CA, which is used by trusted sister XMPP servers to verify connections.
Good lord!Here's a good comparison between XMPP and Matrix: https://lukesmith.xyz/articles/matrix-vs-xmpp.
Matrix is a metadata disaster.
It gets worse. Because Matrix doesn't really just exchange individual messages, but because it syncs entire chats to all involved servers, this means that while all messages might be end-to-end encrypted, the conversation metadata is known to all servers, including what accounts are involved, when messages are sent and other account information made public (for example, users can add their emails and phone numbers to their accounts). See more here.
That means that all Matrix servers, especially Matrix.org, has a huge repository of metadata. Although chats are thankfully encrypted, encrypted chat logs are synced between all relevant servers, spreading metadata far and wide, and nearly always back to Matrix.org.
Reason why is quite simple: because take John Doe user as roadwarrior abroad, just sending some mail using a different MX host with that SPF protected company domain name. Mail gets lost.Sender Policy Framework records are DNS records that identify the mail exchangers that are allowed to forward mail from a given domain. You should reject and probably blacklist any MXs that don't match the SPF record. Unfortunately, not everyone publishes SPF records.
Open relays are a thing of the past. They either get shut down or blocked in minutes nowadays. That road warrior must have an account that requires authentication on some private mail exchanger. That MX should either be listed in the organization's SPF record or should only forward to an MX that is.Reason why is quite simple: because take John Doe user as roadwarrior abroad, just sending some mail using a different MX host with that SPF protected company domain name. Mail gets lost.
This should not happen, but in reality it happens all the time.
Yes, you can put any email you like in the from: header. That is not a way around SPF. SPF check will fail with forged from: headers.Yes, open relays are a past. But it's entirely possible to put in any sending address into Gmail that you want to use, for example. And some people are just exactly doing that.
How?Also mailing lists are another problem which SPF alone probably breaks
No, you can also use it to reject messages with a forged from: sender. There's no legitimate reason to do that.SPF is just one technic which can be used to restrain some abuse of your domain, and keep its reputation high amongst MTAs evaluations SPF records. That's all about it.
No, I'd never heard of of that, and reading that Wikipedia page, I'm not surprised. It lists two authorities for this scheme. The first one is a draft standard that expired in 2003 and doesn't mention mailing lists at all. The second one is another draft standard, this time from 2004 (no expiration date) that explicitly says:Never heared about SRS?
Emphasis mine.SRS must be implemented by all mail servers which forward mail from a domain which does not designate
the sender of that mail in its SPF record. This includes:
• Many servers which support .forward files.
• Third party mail forwarders.
This does not include:
• All mail user agents.
• Most mailing list providers.
Received: from mx2.freebsd.org (mx2.freebsd.org [96.47.72.81])
(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256)
(No client certificate requested)
by myserver (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4D5EC21D9A6
for <me>; Wed, 4 May 2022 20:46:15 +0000 (UTC)
(envelope-from freebsd-ports+bounces-1867-myemailaddress@FreeBSD.org)
Sender: owner-freebsd-ports@freebsd.org
$ drill freebsd.org txt | grep spf
freebsd.org. 3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org"
$ drill _spf.freebsd.org txt | grep spf
;; _spf.freebsd.org. IN TXT
_spf.freebsd.org. 242 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:96.47.72.81 ip6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:2 ~all"
What problems?That's what was introduced to overcome those problems.