Android internet banking applications security is based on X.509, at least that is the case for major European banks.
My m-banking application requires physical activation at the bank. You download the application normally from the store whenever prior. But it is at that moment that you sign activation papers, and your encrypted certificate bundle is downloaded to the device, and then the clerk generates activation numbers, which decrypt the bundle, and you go on to protect it with PIN definition.
Man in the 2FA middle doesn't work because of physical human contact.
Later on, it's like anything else, where Android sucks, but you should still have nominal security. E.g. I don't believe something like Google Pixel can be easily remote exploited. Installing shady applications from Google Play might leak out some of your personal data but application keystores, and exploit the system to catch PIN entry, I don't think so.
The problem is that my bank removed e-access to m-access years ago. Technically people have been nagging about that for a while, because no one likes having to manage a separate device just to have a sense of mobile security, but people yield down and install it on main phone they tend to use with care (meaning only Google steals your data), and we still haven't got any decent case where the system was exploited without grave, capital user error.