If someone sits down at your console, all your security precautions are already over. But let's speculate about what you want to do.
Logging? Most shells already do that, and keep the log in a history. I happen to use bash, you just type "history", and it shows you what you did:
Code:
24 [2020-03-19 22:32:15 -0700] cd Desktop/House/lr_eqmon
25 [2020-03-19 22:32:17 -0700] hg pull
26 [2020-03-19 22:32:21 -0700] hg update
27 [2020-03-19 22:32:29 -0700] ./autoTest -i flow
28 [2020-03-19 22:44:08 -0700] ./autoTest -i all noflow
29 [2020-03-19 22:45:24 -0700] ls AUTOTEST.results/
30 [2020-03-19 22:45:35 -0700] ./autoTest all noflow
31 [2020-03-19 22:48:30 -0700] hg status
(those are results from a random window, I guess I was running tests on a bit of software after it got modified on a different branch).
Now, the history log is not an audit-quality log. To begin with, the user can remove or modify the log themselves. But it wouldn't be very difficult to create a new shell that does tamper-proof audit logging.
Renaming commands? Theoretically possible: Just cd to /usr/bin or /bin, and go to town. In practice, this would be a disaster. To begin with, all the system boot and operation scripts would break. Upgrades would become impossible (how would the upgrade know that you have renamed /bin/ls to /bin/adam_and_eve?). Any software that contains scripts or executes existing system binaries would break. I think this is a crazy suggestion.
Oh, and you can't rename the cd executable, because cd is a shell builtin command. Which is perfectly logical if you understand how the current directory and other process environment settings (like environment variables) work: cd (and setenv) have to be shell builtins, since there is no way for a program to change the current working directory of a shell from the outside. You could rename the /usr/bin/cd executable, but that accomplishes nothing (I don't even know when it is used or what it does, but it is not the normal cd operation).