Not true on Wayland. On Gnome Mutter this was explicitly rejected:I figure any app can spy on anything regardless of OS.
Umm... isn't this what spectre, meltdown and the rest were about? Nothing is truly secure. Using wayland instead of X doesn't make you invulnerable, although it might give you a warm fuzzy feeling of security. Sure, wayland closes off some known X11 vulnerabilities.... I wonder what new, currently unknown vulnerabilities it opens. And if you're worried about keylogging... use a wired keyboard, not wireless, to avoid your keypresses getting sniffed through the air!Not true on Wayland. On Gnome Mutter this was explicitly rejected:
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Allow Xwayland application keylogging (#2565) · Issues · GNOME / mutter · GitLab
Feature summary Due to how Wayland works, it blocks applications from viewing keypresses when not focused (without root access). However, in...gitlab.gnome.org
No. It's not the same class of vulnerabilities.Umm... isn't this what spectre, meltdown and the rest were about? Nothing is truly secure. Using wayland instead of X doesn't make you invulnerable, although it might give you a warm fuzzy feeling of security. Sure, wayland closes off some known X11 vulnerabilities.... I wonder what new, currently unknown vulnerabilities it opens. And if you're worried about keylogging... use a wired keyboard, not wireless, to avoid your keypresses getting sniffed through the air!
Dobts.unless I explicitly want to
It can be done and should be done at all levels, not just the kernel.Dobts.
If you can specify allowing access from others or not, malicious programs can possibly do it via known/unknown vulnerabilities.
The only way to close the hole would be mutually disallowing to share files in kernel level (or disk sector level by firmwares level). It's clearly useless (as even priviledged admins cannot fix broken config files of specific groups and/or users) in real world. So there's mutually trade-offs.
My point is that the lower the layer is, the difficult to plug holes from higher layers. Not saying the kernel alone is responsible.It can be done and should be done at all levels, not just the kernel.
Maybe true for now. But I think if anyone possible are interested in it, the people/group can fork xorg and/or XLibre and implement configurable option to plug it or not.If Wayland could restrict keyloggers and X11 couldn't, then clearly X11 sucks.
Sadly neither can any more or less than each other. Both effectively "suck" for your use-case.If Wayland could restrict keyloggers and X11 couldn't, then clearly X11 sucks.
The fact that Wayland is a completely different API means that no matter what Xlibre does, it can't break compat worse than Wayland.X11Libre fans will be disappointed when they break compatibility with all apps in ways worse than Wayland...
That sounds like a type of security that would slow down general usage. I like the idea if I was going for it, but I prefer desktop speed and the idea everything I run is trusted enough to not need that layer of security.No. It's not the same class of vulnerabilities.
Apps should be restricted to the data they may access. Ideally sandboxed. This is called PoLA.
It's never ok that an app may sniff into another unless I explicitly want to.
I don't do exactly this, but I have $WORK machines (laptops) that I ssh into with X forwarding so I can "emacs work files" because I hate the format of laptops (3/4 keyboards, small screens, etc)I don't use Wayland here because I still run apps on my machines in my basement while sitting at my desk with my laptop inserted into its base station here on the second floor of my home (with CAT6 running from the basement to various rooms of this 113 year old house). A powerful laptop generally used as an X terminal in the traditional sense. You can't do this with Wayland (except with Xwayland).
Yep.If browsers were less scummy then the next bastion is the display server. But at this point, X11 IPC is the least of our worries.
The only thing I would trust at this point is online banking via an SSH session. But unfortunately the mouth-breathing public prefer insecurity rather than a lack of.... pictures.
8+ years mouse experience tells me gaming was in no way a priority for Wayland. "Gamers" were praising GNOME on Wayland before 42 somehow where mouse timings were the worst.So if a primary driver of Wayland was "gaming", I think a reasonable follow on should be "what percentage of *nix users are playing games that require the high fps/whatever metric".
CPU mitigations are the only thing that slow down CPU's but I only disable them on VM's where I don't use any credentials with networking. Otherwise I keep them on.That sounds like a type of security that would slow down general usage. I like the idea if I was going for it, but I prefer desktop speed and the idea everything I run is trusted enough to not need that layer of security.
You need root privileges for that. Root can do anything. Don't compare that with a random X11 app that can sniff and inject anything running rootless.re - wayland protection from key loggers. This is just plain silly. Granted, my driver experience is in Linux, but if freeBSD has the same usbmon type module that linux has then all USB traffic can be monitored, so no, wayland cannot prevent keylogging, since the keyboard is an HID driver class and is subject to the "kernel's" IO contraints.
you say that like that's a bad thing. Set your xauth or xhost var correctly and only run apps on your display that you control. I don't see the problem, never have.Don't compare that with a random X11 app that can sniff and inject anything running rootless.
I might have above-average speed and can notice SSD encryption enough to not use it even on NVMe + CPU AESSpeed has never been an issue on recent hardware with SSD drives since 15 years ago. Everyone encrypts their hard drives now.
I don't notice it even on a Raspberry Pi 5b with ZFS and LUKS on Debian.I might have above-average speed and can notice SSD encryption enough to not use it even on NVMe + CPU AES![]()
re - wayland protection from key loggers. This is just plain silly. Granted, my driver experience is in Linux, but if freeBSD has the same usbmon type module that linux has then all USB traffic can be monitored, so no, wayland cannot prevent keylogging, since the keyboard is an HID driver class and is subject to the "kernel's" IO contraints.
Wayland is excellent for gaming. That's the reason I really want it to work on my Nvidia RTX 4060. I'm giving up like 11 FPS in some games...But it's not a priority. Just fun to test games.I don't do exactly this, but I have $WORK machines (laptops) that I ssh into with X forwarding so I can "emacs work files" because I hate the format of laptops (3/4 keyboards, small screens, etc)
Yep.
So if a primary driver of Wayland was "gaming", I think a reasonable follow on should be "what percentage of *nix users are playing games that require the high fps/whatever metric".
Now as far as games go, games designed for children (say less than 10 yrs old) I think have higher requirements than your latest shoot em up game. Why? Have you seen the attention span of a toddler?
My opinons only:
The patterns between "gaming" (typically full screen, single application on top) vs "General use of a windowed system" (browser, multiple terminal windows, ssh sessions, running make, etc) are 180 out of phase. If Wayland is trying to optimize for the gaming experience, that implies (to me) "We don't care about the general use case. We want the single application on top to have the best performance"
I think "Wayland is an answer to a specific set of requirements" but "Wayland is not THE answer to every use case"
Shameless plug, I know, but XLibre Xnamespaces are now a feature too!you say that like that's a bad thing. Set your xauth or xhost var correctly and only run apps on your display that you control. I don't see the problem, never have.